Pensamientos de Hussman

"If you have bad banks then you very urgently want to clean up your banks because bad banks go only one way: they get worse. In the end every bank is a fiscal problem. When you have bad banks, it is in a political environment where it is totally understood that the government is going to bail them out in the end. And that's why they are so bad, and that's why they get worse. So cleaning up the banks is an essential counterpart of any attempt to have a well functioning economy. It is a counterpart of any attempt to have a dull, uninteresting macroeconomy. And there is no excuse to do it slowly because it is very expensive to postpone the cleanup. There is no technical issue in doing the cleanup. It's mostly to decide to start to grow up and stop the mess."

MIT Economist Rudiger Dornbusch, November 1998

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Comprar protección (2ª parte)

IBEX 35: continuamos viendo en los 9.300 puntos un objetivo razonable mientras la deuda española se mantenga por encima de los 200 pb de diferencial frente Alemania en todos los plazos

Las decisiones de inversión a lo largo del ciclo

Felix Zulauf:

• Cyclicality: Economies and markets move in recurring cycles;
• Valuation: Relative valuation between asset classes reverts to a mean over long periods of time;
• Sentiment: Sentiment is a useful contrary indicator, especially at extremes;
• Momentum: Over the medium term, cyclical trends can develop their own sustaining momentum;
• Risk Management: Minimizing losses and managing exposure are crucial components of positive returns.

Reacciones QE: Nikkei vs S&P 500

Desde pragcap.com:

"When the BOJ first announced QE in Japan in March 2001 the Nikkei 225 went wild.  Over the following 6 weeks equities rallied over 16%.  The reaction has been almost identical in the S&P 500 over the last 2 months.  But as investors in the USA begin to realize that QE is not the panacea it was first advertised as the S&P 500 has begun to reverse course.  In Japan, this was a scenario that did not end well as equities declined 43% in the following two years.  Although history rarely, if ever repeats, this is one chart that might be worth taking note of:"

Rango objetivo IBEX 35: 9.300-10.200

La repreciación de riesgo soberano periférico ha saltado esta semana a España e Italia. En el caso español, a la superación de los 200 pb en el diferencial de deuda a 10 años con Alemania hay que sumar la prima de riesgo relativa que también está soportando el IBEX 35. Así, frente al 5,5% de prima de riesgo implícita que extraemos de las valoraciones del EuroStoxx nos encontramos con un 6,58% para el caso del IBEX 35, una prima de riesgo diferencial que supera los 100 pb. Niveles sobre los que podría mantenerse en las próximas semanas si no observamos una mejora en los diferenciales de deuda pública.

Implicaciones para los niveles objetivo del IBEX 35: con un ciclo de beneficios creciendo a ritmos del (4%-6%) en acumulado a lo largo de los próximos 5 años junto con una prima de riesgo diferencial en la parte alta del rango 100-125 pb frente a EuroStoxx, obtenemos un rango objetivo entre los 9.300-10.200 puntos.

The Cliff

Desde el semanal de Hussman:

"It should not be a surprise if present levels of corporate profits are followed by negative profit growth over the coming 5 years"

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Primas de riesgo y bancos centrales

En adelante, los 110 mil millones USD de compras mensuales de deuda que va a ejecutar la Reserva Federal hasta JUN11 apuntan a que (1) el balance de la Reserva Federal volverá a ganar peso explicativo en la dinámica de las cotizaciones bursátiles y (2) estas últimas podrían continuar con la inercia alcista apoyada exclusivamente por la estrategia de inflación de activos de la Fed a la espera de un relevo desde el ámbito “fundamental”. Mientras tanto, las valoraciones continuarán muy alejadas del outlook económico actual, y por lo tanto, en una situación muy vulnerable.

The Many Faces Of Deleveraging

Desde Contrary Investor:

Enough charts and numbers and all that other stuff.  We think the summation messages are very clear and certainly have implications for at least a domestic economy that is suffering primarily from a lack of aggregate demand, let alone a global economy in part suffering from the same.  As hard as this may be to hear, deleveraging is still barely out of the total cycle starting gates.  At the household level we have not yet even seen organic deleveraging, but rather deleverageing through defaults.  Jobs and income growth are the keys to the deleveraging process at the household level, but they are for all intents and purposes missing in action in the current cycle.  And that speaks to time.  Time for true balance sheet healing and ultimately a recovery in aggregate demand.  The very means for households to delever independent of default are not visible.  Not yet.  And so we need to expect 1) a stop-start real world domestic economic recovery, 2) Fed QE that does nothing to reinvigorate the real economy, but has the real potential to create yet more unproductive asset bubbles, 3) continued volatility in financial asset and commodity prices based on investor perceptions of Fed and global central banker sponsored liquidity and the effectiveness or not of liquidity injections at any point in time.  In reality, this is nothing we have not already been dealing with up to this point.  But for our investment activities specifically, we believe it all comes down to just how far the Fed and their global central banking brethren are willing to push the envelope in terms of money printing, currency intervention, etc.  For now, investors still view these activities as virtuous.  But at some point unless we do indeed see true real world economic reinvigoration, we believe the markets will come to view further Fed and global central banker monetary "experiments" quite negatively.  All part of the psychology of a financial market and economic cycle.

El informe completo, aquí